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Abstract
Distributed algorithms typically run over arbitrary many processes and may involve unboundedly
many rounds, making the automated verification of their correctness challenging. Building on domain
theory, we introduce a framework that abstracts infinite-state distributed systems that represent
distributed algorithms into finite-state guard automata. The soundness of the approach corresponds
to the Scott-continuity of the abstraction, which relies on the assumption that the distributed
algorithms are layered. Guard automata thus enable the verification of safety and liveness properties
of distributed algorithms.
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1 Introduction
Under the umbrella of parameterized verification, the verification of systems formed of an
arbitrary number of agents executing the same code, has attracted quite some attention
in the recent years, see for instance [18, 9]. Application examples range from distributed
algorithms (e.g., for clock synchronization [28] or robot coordination [27]), cache-coherence
protocols [25, 1], to chemical or biological systems [10]. In all cases, the systems are designed
to operate correctly independently of the number of agents.
More specifically, distributed algorithms are central to various emblematic applications,
including telecommunications, scientific computing, and Blockchain. Automatically proving
the correctness of distributed algorithms is a particularly relevant, as stated by Lamport:
“Model-checking algorithms prior to submitting them for publication should become the
norm” [22]. The task, that the verification community has started to address, is quite
challenging, since it aims at validating at once all instances of the algorithm for arbitrarily
many processes.
Distributed algorithms with threshold guards are omni-present in solutions for consensus
and agreement problems. Typically, these guards also are parameterized, e.g., if the number
of processes in a distributed system is n, then it is natural to require that certain actions
are taken only if a majority of processes is ready to do so; this results in a parameterized
threshold expression of n/2. Due to Blockchain and other current applications these kinds of
distributed algorithm enjoy recent attention from the algorithm design community as well as
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the verification community. the algorithm design community has been studying them for a
long time, (see e.g., [11]) and typically provides hand-written proofs based on mathematical
models without formal semantics.
For computer-aided verification the first challenge is to develop appropriate modeling
formalisms that maintain all behaviors of the original algorithms on the one hand, and on
the other hand are abstract and succinct to allow for efficient verification. Several approaches
towards efficient verification have recently been proposed.
The threshold automata framework [20] targets asynchronous distributed algorithms
with threshold guards and reductions (similar to [23, 17]) have been used to show that
SMT-based bounded model checking is complete [19]. Later this framework was generalized
and generalizations were analyzed regarding decidability [21], and complexity [5]. The current
paper also targets threshold distributed algorithms, yet eventually provides an even coarser
abstraction to represent their behaviors, thus reducing the overall verification complexity.
Moreover, the semantics of distributed algorithms and the soundness of the abstraction rely
on domain theory concepts, thus providing a solid mathematical framework to our work.
Last but not least, our approach can handle infinite behaviours, in contrast to the threshold
automata framework.
The logical fragment of the IVy toolset has also been shown to allow to model threshold
guards by axiomising their semantics as quorum systems [7]. For instance, the reason
for waiting for quorums of more than n/2 messages is that any two such quorums must
intersect at one sender. IVy allows to express these quorum axioms and reduce verification
to decidable fragments. Similar intuitions underlie verification results in the heard-of model
(HO model) [13]. This computational model for distributed algorithms already targets a high
level of abstractions that are sound for communication closed distributed algorithms [12].
Here a consensus logic was introduced in [16] that could be used for deductive verification
and cut-off results where provided in [24] that reduce the parameterized verification problem
to small finite instances. Compared to this line of work, the distributed algorithms we target
share some similarities with these round-based communication closed models. Recently, a
threshold automata framework for round-based algorithms was introduced that also uses a
small counterexample property for verification in [29]. In contrast, we use domain theory, and
particularly Scott continuity to be able to reason on infinite behaviors and thus to capture
algorithms that do not necessarily terminate.
Other less related verification frameworks also target distributed algorithms with quite
different techniques such as event B [26], array systems [4] or logic and automata theory [3].
Contributions
Using basic domain theory concepts, we provide a rigorous framework to model and verify
(asynchronous) distributed algorithms. Our methodology applies to distributed algorithms
that are structured in layers (that can be seen as a fine-grain notion of rounds), and may
consist of countably many layers, thus capturing round-based distributed algorithms (with
no a priori bound on the number of rounds).
In Section 2, we define partially ordered transition systems, which serve to express the
semantics our models.
Section 3 introduces the low-level model of layered distributed systems to represent
threshold based distributed algorithms. The state-space of layered distributed systems
being infinite (and even not necessarily finitely representable), we provide several abstrac-
tion steps, up to a so-called guard abstraction. The soundness of each step is justified by
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the Scott-continuity of the corresponding abstraction. Some steps are also complete, and
thus do not introduce spurious behaviors.
Finally, towards practical verification, we define in Section 4 the guard automaton, a
finite-state abstraction of (cyclic) layered distributed systems. It overapproximates the
set of infinite behaviors of distributed algorithms, and thus enabling the verification of
safety as well as liveness properties. Its construction can be automated with the help of
an SMT solver, paving the way to the automated verification of round-based threshold
distributed algorithms.
2 A Fistful of Domain Theory
2.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
This section presents mathematical notions as well as notations that are used throughout the
paper. In particular, it introduces partially ordered sets and Scott topology. The interested
reader is referred to [2] for an thorough introduction to domain theory.
Sets and multisets. A multiset over a set X is an element of NX . Addition and inclusion
over multisets are defined in a natural way. For ξ, ξ′ ∈ NX two multisets, ξ + ξ′ ∈ NX is
the multiset such that for every x ∈ X, (ξ + ξ′) (x) = ξ(x) + ξ′(x). We write ξ ⊑ ξ′ if for
every x ∈ X, ξ(x) ≤ ξ′(x). Standard sets can be seen as special cases of multisets with the
canonical bijection between the set of subsets of X (2X) and the set of functions from X to
{0, 1}.
Sequences. For X a set and n ∈ N a natural number, a sequence of elements of X of length
n is some u ∈ X{0,...,n−1}. Its length is |u| = n and for i < n, u(i) ∈ X denotes the letter at
index i. X∗ =
⋃
n∈NX
{0,...,n−1} (resp. X+ =
⋃
n>0 X
{0,...,n−1}) denotes the set of all finite
(resp. finite and non-empty) sequences of elements of X. Moreover, X∗ = X∗ ∪XN is the
set of finite or infinite sequences of X. For u ∈ X∗ a finite sequence and v ∈ X∗ a finite or
infinite sequence, we write u · v for the concatenation of u and v. For u and w two sequences,
we write u ≺ w and say that u is a prefix of w if either w is finite and there exists v ∈ X∗
such that u · v = w or u = w. For w a sequence and i ≤ |w|, wi is the prefix w of length i.
Closures and bounds for partially ordered sets. Let (X,⊑) be a partially ordered set, and
ξ ⊂ X. The upward-closure of ξ is ↑ξ = {x ∈ X | ∃x′ ∈ ξ, x′ ⊑ x}, and ξ is upward-closed if
↑ξ = ξ. Dually, one defines the downward-closure ↓ξ and downward-closed sets. An element
x ∈ X is an upper-bound of ξ if for any element x′ ∈ ξ, x′ ⊑ x. We write ub(ξ) for the set of
upper-bounds of ξ. If it exists (it is then unique), the greatest element of ξ is x ∈ X such
that x ∈ ξ and x ∈ ub(ξ). Dually, one defines the notion of least element by reversing the
order. If it exists, the least upper bound of ξ is the least element of ub(ξ), and we denote
it by
⊔
ξ. Finally ξ is directed if it is non-empty and if for every two elements x, x′ ∈ ξ,
ub({x, x′})∩ ξ ̸= ∅; intuitively, any finite subset of ξ has an upper-bound in ξ. An interesting
particular case of directed case are completely ordered sets which are called chains in this
context.
Directed Complete Partially ordered sets (DCPO). A DCPO is a partially ordered set
(X,⊑) such that any directed subset ξ ⊂ X has a (unique) least upper bound. These partially
ordered sets are particularly important in semantics of programming languages.
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The Scott Topology on DCPO. Directed complete partial orders are naturally equipped
with the Scott topology. A subset ξ of a DCPO (X,⊑) is Scott-closed if it is downward-closed
and if for any directed subset ξ′ ⊂ ξ,
⊔
ξ′ ∈ ξ. A subset is Scott-open if its complement in X is
Scott-closed. Functions that are continuous for the Scott topology are called Scott-continuous.
A function f : X → Y is monotonous if for any x, x′ ∈ X, if x ⊑ x′ then f(x) ⊑ f(x′). A
Scott-continuous function is always monotonous. A function f : X → Y is Scott-continuous




(f(ξ)). In this paper, a partial
function f : X → Y is called Scott-continuous if its domain dom(f) is Scott-closed and if for





2.2 Partially Ordered Transition Systems
Building on domain theory, this section introduces a generic model for distributed transition
systems, that will capture the semantics of distributed algorithms. An ordering naturally
appears on sets of sent messages –that can only grow– and the asynchrony requires the order
to be partial only.
▶ Definition 1. A partially ordered transition system (POTS) is a tuple O = (X,⊑, A) where:
(X,⊑) forms a DCPO.
A is a set of partial functions, called actions, from X to itself and such that for every
a ∈ A and every x ∈ dom(a), x ⊑ a(x).
▶ Definition 2. A schedule is a (finite or infinite) sequence of actions: σ = (at)t<T , with
T ∈ N. A schedule σ = (at)t<T is applicable at x ∈ X if there exists a sequence (xt)t<T +1
with x0 = x, and for every t < T , xt ∈ dom(at) and at(xt) = xt+1. In this case, we write
configs(x, σ) for the sequence (xt)t<T +1, and x ⋆ σ for
⊔
{xt | t < T+1}.
The above definition uses the convention that∞+1 =∞. Note that if σ is applicable at x,
then the sequence (xt)t<T +1 is unique. Moreover, the least upper bound
⊔
{xt | t < T + 1}
exists because for any t < T , xt ⊑ xt+1 and {xt | t < T + 1} is therefore a chain. When
σ = (at)t<T is finite, x ⋆ σ = x ⋆ a0 ⋆ · · · ⋆ aT −1 denotes the last element of the monotonous
sequence configs(x, σ). In particular, for a ∈ A and x ∈ dom(a), x⋆a = a(x). When σt ∈ At is
defined as the prefix of length t of σ, xt = x⋆σt and it follows: x⋆σ =
⊔
{x⋆σt | t < T, t ∈ N}.
The following lemma will be useful throughout the paper:
▶ Lemma 3. For x ∈ X, the set App(x) of schedules applicable at x is Scott-closed for the
prefix ordering and the function: [x ⋆ _] : App(x)→ X is Scott-continuous.
▶ Definition 4. An abstraction between POTS O = (X,⊑, A) and O′ = (X ′,⊑, A′) consists
of
a set abstraction abX : X → X ′ which is a Scott-continuous function;
a monoid abstraction abA : A∗ → A′∗ which is a monoid morphism (with slight abuse of
notation, abA also denotes its Scott-continuous extension A∗ → A′∗);
both such that for every a ∈ A and every x ∈ dom(a), abA(a) ∈ A′∗ is applicable at
abX(x) ∈ X ′ and abX(x ⋆ a) = abX(x) ⋆ abA(a).
The last condition of the definition of abstraction translates into the commutativity of the
diagram in Figure 1a. The soundness of the abstraction for any (possibly infinite) schedule
is stated in the following proposition and illustrated on Figure 1b.
▶ Proposition 5. Let (abX , abA) be an abstraction between O = (X,⊑, A) and O′ =
(X ′,⊑, A′), x ∈ X be an element, and σ ∈ A∗ a schedule. If σ is applicable at x, then
abA(σ) is applicable at abX(x) and abX(x ⋆ σ) = abX(x) ⋆ abA(σ).
N. Bertrand, B. Thomas, and J. Widder 15:5
dom(a) ⊂ X X




(a) By Definition 4 diagram commutes for any
action a ∈ A.
X X · · · X






(b) By Proposition 5 diagram commutes for any sched-
ule σ.
Figure 1 (abX , abA) forms an abstraction between the POTS (X,⊑, A) and (X ′,⊑, A′).
The proof of this proposition is by transfinite induction on the length of schedules:
showing that the result holds for finite schedules is easy, and continuity arguments (such as
Lemma 3) are then used to extend to infinite schedules.
3 Layered Distributed Systems and their Abstractions
This section introduces a low-level model for distributed algorithms, whose semantics will be
expressed as a POTS. The model is structured in layers, thus restricting the application to
algorithms with a specific shape. However, many distributed algorithms from the literature
fall in this class, and minor modifications of other algorithms make them amenable to
our techniques. The restriction to layered models is used several times in the theoretical
developments that follow.
3.1 Layered Distributed Transition Systems
This section introduces Layered Distributed Transition Systems (LDTSs) as a model for
distributed algorithms, such as the Phase King algorithm [8]. A simplified version of the
algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. This algorithm operates in rounds, each consisting of
three steps:
Broadcast a message (ℓ, m) to all process where ℓ is the round index (line 3)
Receive the messages (ℓ, _) sent in this round (line 4)
Update the process variables according to the received messages (lines 5 to 12)
In general, such a series of three instructions, indexed by ℓ ∈ N, is called a layer and it refines
the classical notion of rounds: for instance, in Ben-Or’s consensus algorithm [6], each round
comprises two layers. Note that layers are assumed to be communication-closed [17, 14]: the
update instruction at layer ℓ only depends on received messages from the same layer.
Distributed algorithms run over a finite set of processes, and at every point in time, the
local state of a process is defined by the valuation of its local variables. In this paper, the
contents of a sent message is not particularly relevant as it can be deduced from the local
state of its sender. Therefore, the communications can be encoded by guards that prevent
a process from taking a transition if a condition on the state of other processes is not met.
Formally, the syntax of layered distributed transition systems is as follows:
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Algorithm 1 Inspired by the Phase King Algorithm, this algorithm is a synchronous
algorithm targetting the resolution of binary consensus. It executes t+1 rounds. In round
ℓ ∈ {0 . . . t}, the local value v of each process is updated either according to the majority, or
to the value of the process with id ℓ (the King process).
1 Process PhaseKing(n, t, id, v):
Data: n processes, t < n4 Byzantine faults, id ∈ {0 . . . n− 1}, v ∈ {0, 1}.
2 for ℓ = 0 to t do
3 broadcast (ℓ, id, v)
4 receive all the messages (ℓ, _, _)
5 n0 ← number of messages (ℓ, _, 0) received
6 n1 ← number of messages (ℓ, _, 1) received
7 if n0 > n2 + t then
8 v ← 0
9 else if n1 > n2 + t then
10 v ← 1
11 else
12 v ← v′ where (ℓ, ℓ, v′) is a received message
13 end
14 return v;
▶ Definition 6. A layered distributed transition system (LDTS) is a tuple D = (P, S, guard)
where:
P is a finite set of processes
S is a set of states partitioned in layers: S =
⋃
ℓ∈N Sℓ.
For ⊥ a new element, set S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥} and for ℓ ∈ N, S⊥ℓ = Sℓ ∪ ⊥.
The set S⊥ is partially ordered with s ⊑ s′ if s = ⊥ or s = s′.
guard : S2 → 2[P →S
⊥] associates to each pair of states a guard.
Additionally, the following layered hypothesis is imposed:
For ℓ ∈ N, s ∈ Sℓ and s′ ∈ S, guard(s, s′) ∈ 2[P →S
⊥
ℓ ], and if s′ /∈ Sℓ+1, then
guard(s, s′) = ∅.
Intuitively, for ℓ ∈ N, Sℓ is the set of states a process can be in at layer ℓ, and ⊥ is used to
represent that a process has not reached that layer yet. Although trivial, the ordering on S⊥
shows sufficient to represent the semantics of distributed algorithms. Moreover, the guards
correspond to a condition on messages received from other processes. Having x ∈ guard(s, s′)
with x(p) = ⊥ means that there are no conditions on the messages received from process p,
so that a process in state s can go to s′ even if it has not received any message from p.
To define the semantics of LDTS, recall that the system a priori runs fully asynchronously,
so that processes may be in different layers1. However, messages may be received by processes
even if the sender has later reached a layer. This means that the state of each process at
each layer should be recorded in the semantics of a LDTS. An agglomeration of local states
is called a configuration. A full configuration additionally stores the messages received by
each process, as formalized below:
▶ Definition 7. Let D = (P, S, guard) be an LDTS. A full configuration of D is a pair
cf = (state(cf ), received(cf )) where
state(cf ) : P → S+ is such that for every p ∈ P and ℓ ∈ N
if ℓ <
∣∣state(cf )(p)∣∣, then state(cf )(p)(ℓ) ∈ Sℓ and the latter is the state of p in ℓ;
if ℓ ≥
∣∣state(cf )(p)∣∣, then state(cf )(p)(ℓ) = ⊥ ∈ S⊥ℓ .
received(cf ) : P → P → N→ S⊥ such that for every p ∈ P , received(cf )(p) ⊑ state(cf ).
1 Synchronous systems can also be represented by LDTS, as illustrated with the Phase King algorithm.
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The set of full configurations is denoted Cf . It is partially ordered with ⊑ defined by cf ⊑ cf ′ if
state(cf ) ⊑ state(cf ′) pointwise with the prefix ordering on S+ and received(cf ) ⊑ received(cf ′)
pointwise.







(P 2 ×N, =)→ (S⊥,⊑)
]
and is therefore a DCPO
too.
At a full configuration cf ∈ Cf , two types of actions may happen, corresponding to
receptions and internal transitions. First, a process p ∈ P may receive a message that was
sent in layer ℓ ∈ N by a process p′ ∈ P ; this action is denoted rec (p, ℓ, p′). Second, a process
p ∈ P may move from a state s ∈ Sℓ to state s′ ∈ Sℓ+1, denoted tr (p, s, s′). The effect of
actions on full configurations is formally defined as follows:
▶ Definition 8. The set of actions of an LDTS D = (P, S, guard) is
Af = {rec (p, p′, ℓ) | p, p′ ∈ P, ℓ ∈ N} ∪
⋃
ℓ∈N
{tr (p, s, s′) | p ∈ P, s ∈ Sℓ, s′ ∈ Sℓ+1} .
For cf ∈ Cf and rec (p, p′, ℓ) ∈ Af , the full configuration cf ′ = rec (p, p′, ℓ) (cf ) is defined by:
state(cf ′) = state(cf )
received(cf ′)(p)(p′)(ℓ) = state(cf )(p′)(ℓ) and received(cf ′) equals received(cf ) elsewhere.
For cf ∈ Cf and tr (p, s, s′) ∈ Af , writing ℓ =
∣∣state(cf )(p)∣∣− 1, then tr (p, s, s′) is enabled
at cf ∈ Cf if: ℓ < ∞, state(cf )(p)(ℓ) = s and received(cf )(p)(_)(ℓ) ∈ guard(s)(s′). In this
case, the full configuration cf ′ = tr (p, s, s′) (cf ) is defined with:
state(cf ′)(p) = state(cf )(p) · s′ and state(cf ′) equals state(cf ) elsewhere.
received(cf ′) = received(cf )
Note that the reception actions are always enabled. So defined, the semantics of an LDTS is




; in particular, the notions of schedules and abstractions apply.
▶ Example 9. Consider the Phase King algorithm run by three correct processes and a
Byzantine one. The Byzantine process is not represented explicitly (P = {p0, p1, p2} only
contains correct processes) but the guards of the LDTS account for the messages it may
send. Also, the King is chosen at each round non-deterministically, abstracting process ids.
A correct process in layer ℓ may be in one of four states Sℓ = {v0, v1, k0, k1}, where
kx (resp. vx) represents that the local value of v is x ∈ {0, 1} and that the process is
currently King (resp. not King). A full configuration, say cf , is depicted top-left of Figure 2.
The sequence states process p0 went through so far is state(cf )(p0) = v0 · k1 · v1. Also,
received(cf )(p0)(p2)(0) = v1 represents that process p0 received the message that process p2
was in state v1 at layer 0. In contrast, p0 does not know the state of p2 at layer 2 (represented
by a blank space instead of ⊥ for commodity). Thus, in cf , the message sent by process p2 at
layer 2 has yet to be received by p0. The action rec (p0, p2, 2) corresponding to this reception
is therefore enabled at cf . The resulting configuration cf ⋆ rec (p0, p2, 2) would be identical
to cf except for received(cf ⋆ rec (p0, p2, 2))(p0)(p2)(2) = state(cf )(p2)(2) = v1 instead of ⊥.
The reception rec (p0, p1, 2) can also happen at cf ⋆ rec (p0, p2, 2). The resulting configuration
cf
′ = cf ⋆ rec (p0, p2, 2) ⋆ rec (p0, p1, 2) coincides with cf except for
received(cf ′)(p0) =
p0 : v0 k1 v1
p1 : v1 v1 k1
p2 : v1 v0 v1
Now p0 has received more than n2 + t messages in {v1, k1} so that it updates its value to 1 in
the next round. Therefore, the action tr (p0, v1, v1) is enabled at cf
′ and the configuration
cf
′
⋆ tr (p0, v1, v1) is equal to cf




⋆ tr (p0, v1, v1)
)
= v0 · k1 · v1 · v1.
CONCUR 2021
15:8 Guard Automata for the Verification ofSafety and Liveness of Distributed Algorithms
3.2 Abstracting Received Messages
The partially ordered transition system OfD is fine-grained and rather complex to analyze,
therefore the aim of the rest of this section is to define simpler POTS, that preserve or
overapproximate the semantics of OfD. The successive steps are represented in Figure 2.
Full Configuration
state p0 v0 k1 v1 · ·
p1 v1 v1 k1 v1 ·
p2 v1 v0 v1 · ·
received(p0) p0 v0 k1 v1 · ·
p1 v1 v1 · · ·
p2 v1 v0 · · ·
received(p1) · · · · · ·
received(p2) · · · · · ·
Succinct Configuration
p0 v0 k1 v1 · ·
p1 v1 v1 k1 v1 ·
p2 v1 v0 v1 · ·


























v0 > 0 T T · · · · ·
k0 > 0 · · · · · · ·
v1 > 0 T T T T · · ·
k1 > 0 · T T · · · ·
2(v0 + k0 + f) > n + 2t · · · · · · ·
2(v1 + k1 + f) > n + 2t · · T · · · ·
2(v0 + k0) > n + 2t · · · · · · ·
2(v1 + k1) > n + 2t · · · · · · ·
v0 + k0 + v1 + k1 + f ≥ n T T T · · · ·
Succinct Abstraction








evalG : C → 2G
Prop. 21
Figure 2 An illustration of the successive abstractions.
The information of messages received by each process is used to check enabledness of
transitions. However, the received messages necessarily form a subset of the sent messages.
Using the notion of abstraction, this section proves that received messages can be forgotten
without losing any information. Instead, it suffices to require the existence of a subset of sent
messages that would enable a transition. Changing views from received messages to sent ones
is often implicit [21, 20] and without restrictions it may introduce spurious counter-examples
(see Example 13). By imposing that each message appears in at most one guard in the
transitions taken by a process, the layering hypothesis guarantees that the abstraction is
complete (Theorem 12). This abstraction is then used to provide a characterization of
reachable configurations (Theorem 15), including those reachable via an infinite schedule.
A succinct configuration is an element of Cs = P → S+. For cs ∈ Cs, p ∈ P , ℓ < |cs(p)|
and s ∈ S, cs(p)(ℓ) = s means that process p is/was in state s at layer ℓ. As before, if ℓ ≥
|cs(p)|, then cs(p)(ℓ) = ⊥, representing that process p has not reached layer ℓ yet. So-defined,
the projection state : Cf → Cs abstracts Cf into Cs, so that the reception actions become
useless. The set of succinct actions is then As =
⋃
ℓ∈N {[p : s→ s′] | p ∈ P, s ∈ Sℓ, s′ ∈ Sℓ+1}
and the monoid morphism simpl : Af ∗ → As∗ is defined by ignoring reception actions.
Formally:
for rec (p, p′, ℓ) ∈ Af , simpl (rec (p, p′, ℓ)) = ε;
for tr (p, s, s′) ∈ Af , simpl (tr (p, s, s′)) = [p : s→ s′].
One can define enabledness of a succinct action, and its effect. For a succinct configuration cs ∈
Cs and a succinct action [p : s→ s′] ∈ As, writing ℓ = |cs(p)| − 1, then [p : s→ s′] is enabled
at cs if ℓ <∞, cs(p)(ℓ) = s and cs(_)(ℓ) ∈↑guard(s)(s′). In this case, ([p : s→ s′](cs)) (p) =
cs(p) · s′ and ([p : s→ s′](cs)) coincides with cs for any other process.
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The first two conditions of enabledness are analogous to the case of the full semantics
(see Definition 8). The last condition however replaces the guard of the edge with its upper
closure. This derives from the fact that the condition now deals with sent messages instead
of received ones, and the latter can only be smaller than the former.
Altogether, the succinct semantics of the LDTS consists of the POTS OsD = (Cs,⊑, As),
whose definition is justified by the following proposition:
▶ Proposition 10. The mappings state : Cf → Cs and simpl : Af ∗ → As∗ define an




to the succinct POTS OsD = (Cs,⊑, As).
▶ Example 11. Consider the succinct configuration cs in the top right of Figure 2. It is
obtained by applying state to the full configuration cf on the left. In Example 9, the full
schedule σf = rec (p0, p2, 2) · rec (p0, p1, 2) · tr (p0, v1, v1) is shown to be applicable at cf .
Therefore, Proposition 10 implies that simpl(σf ) = [p0 : v1 → v1] is applicable at cs.
Propositions 10 and 5 entail that the succinct abstraction is sound in the sense that it does
not remove any existing behavior, and properties that hold on every execution of the succinct
model also hold on the full semantics. However, in general, abstractions are not complete
and they may introduce new behaviors (for instance, schedules without any reception actions
may be applicable in the simplification but not in the full model). Nevertheless, the succinct
abstraction is complete: there always exists an applicable full schedule corresponding to each
applicable succinct schedule.
▶ Theorem 12. Let σs ∈ As∗ be a succinct schedule applicable at an initial configuration
cs ∈ Cs. Then, there exists a full schedule σf ∈ Af ∗ applicable at a full configuration cf ∈ Cf
such that: state(cf ) = cs, simpl(σf ) = σs, and state(cf ⋆ σf ) = cs ⋆ σs.
To prove Theorem 12 one transforms each action [p : s→ s′] into a finite schedule of
the form (rec (p, pu, ℓ))u<U · tr (p, s, s′), carefully choosing the receptions to ensure that the
last transition is enabled. To do so, the difficulties are twofold. First, the full schedule
(rec (p, pu, ℓ))u<U · tr (p, s, s′) not only depends on [p : s→ s′], but also on the current con-
figuration. Therefore one cannot define a trivial abstraction. Second, this method requires
a way to control the buffers of received messages throughout the schedule. Indeed, one
should avoid that a process receives too many messages to take a transition, as ‘un-receiving’
messages in impossible. This is where the layered structure comes into play, and ensures that
when a process receives messages enabling a transition, no earlier transition required these.
▶ Example 13. As explained, the layering assumption is crucial in Theorem 12. Consider the
non layered distributed transition system with four states a, b, c, x, and two processes p, p′. Let
cf be the initial full configuration with state(cf )(p) = a and state(cf )(p′) = x. Intuitively, in
this counterexample, the guards are set such that the first transition tr (p, a, b) is enabled only
if received(cf )(p)(p′) = x while the next transition tr (p, b, c) requires received(cf )(p)(p′) =
⊥ ̸= x. Process p would thus have to “forget” that it received a message from p′ in order to
take the second transition, which is impossible in the full semantics.
In contrast, the succinct semantics does not record whether p has already received the
message from p′ when approaching the second transition. The succinct schedule [p : a→ b] ·
[p : b→ c] is therefore applicable at state(cf ) which would contradict Theorem 12 for unlayered
distributed transition systems. Imposing that each message appears at most in one guard
along the execution of a process, the layered hypothesis prevents this type of counterexamples.
The advantage of the succinct semantics over the full one is that the guards can only
become true during an execution. This monotony property, combined with the layered
hypothesis, entail the possibility to check that a configuration is reachable a posteriori,
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simply by verifying that the guards of the transitions that are taken are verified in the last
configuration. In particular, this avoids building explicitly the schedule at all intermediate
configurations. This is formally stated in the following definition and theorem.
▶ Definition 14. A succinct configuration cs ∈ Cs is coherent if for any p ∈ P and ℓ ∈ N,
if cs(p)(ℓ) = s ̸= ⊥ and cs(p)(ℓ + 1) = s′ ̸= ⊥, then cs(_)(ℓ) ∈↑guard(s, s′).
▶ Theorem 15. Let cs, cs′ ∈ Cs be two succinct configurations such that cs is coherent.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
cs ⊑ cs′ and cs′ is coherent.
There exists a (possibly infinite) schedule σs ∈ As∗ applicable at cs such that cs ⋆ σs = cs′.
3.3 Counter Abstraction
The theory presented so far dealt with a fixed set P of processes. As an advantage, the
guards of the edges could be any condition on the set of received messages, but as a drawback,
it is impossible to represent parameterised systems where the number of processes is not
fixed. To remedy this downside, this section introduces layered threshold automata (LTA).
While this model is syntactically similar to threshold automata [20], its semantics in terms
of a POTS is novel. Natural abstractions between the semantics of LDTS and LTA can then
be presented, proving that LTA form a faithful representation of distributed algorithms, in
contrast to unrestricted threshold automata.
▶ Definition 16. A Layered Threshold Automaton (LTA) is a tuple T = (R, S, guard) where:
R is a set of parameters
S is a set of states partitioned into layers: S =
⋃∞
i=0 Si, with S0 the set of initial states.
guard : S2 → PA(S ∪R) associates a guard, in Presburger arithmetic over free variables
in S ∪R, to each pair of states. The layered hypothesis assumes that for ℓ ∈ N, s ∈ Sℓ,
and s′ ∈ S, guard(s, s′) ∈ PA(Sℓ ∪R) and if s′ /∈ Sℓ+1, guard(s, s′) = false.
The guards are monotonous, i.e. for any guard g ∈ guard(S2), for any valuation ρ ∈ NR,
κ, κ′ ∈ NS, if κ ≤ κ′ when ordered pointwise and if ρ, κ |= g, then ρ, κ′ |= g as well.
The set of parameters R typically includes the number n of processes and an upper bound
t on the number of faulty processes. Intuitively, the guards represent the conditions on
sent messages for taking the corresponding transition. The monotony assumption therefore
requires that guards in the algorithms concern received messages only, which may be any
subset of the sent messages.
In the remainder of this section, T = (R, S, guard) is a fixed LTA. A configuration c of T
is defined by:
a parameter valuation param(c) ∈ R→ N that remains constant during an execution;
a counting mapping κ(c) ∈ S → N where κ(c)(s) = k means that k processes have visited
the state s;
flow counters flow(c) ∈
(⋃
ℓ∈N Sℓ × Sℓ+1
)
→ N where flow(c)(s, s′) = k means that k
processes moved from s to s′.
Moreover, processes that leave a state must have entered it, therefore, configuations should
also verify the following flow conditions:
- in: for every ℓ ∈ N \ {0} and every s ∈ Sℓ,
∑
s′∈Sℓ−1 flow(c)(s
′, s) = κ(c)(s)
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The set C of all configurations is equipped with the natural order ⊑ defined by c ⊑ c′ if
param(c) = param(c′), κ(c) ≤ κ(c′) and flow(c) ≤ flow(c′).
An action over C is an element of A =
⋃
ℓ∈NAℓ where for ℓ ∈ N, Aℓ =
{[s→ s′] | s ∈ sℓ, s′ ∈ Sℓ+1}. For c ∈ C, an action [s→ s′] ∈ Aℓ is enabled at c if:∑
s′′∈Sℓ+1 flow(c)(s, s
′′) < κ(c)(s), and
param(c), κ(c) |= guard(s, s′), written c |= guard(s, s′) for short.
In so, the successor configuration [s→ s′] (c) = c′ ∈ C is defined by:
param(c′) = param(c)
flow(c′) = flow(c) + 1(s,s′) where 1(s,s′)(s, s′) = 1 and 1(s,s′)(e) = 0 elsewhere.
κ(c′) = κ(c) + 1s′ where 1s′(s′) = 1 and 1s′(s′′) = 0 elsewhere.
One can easily check that configuration c′ verifies the flow conditions.
The semantics of the LTA T is defined as the POTS OT = (C,⊑, A).
For ρ ∈ NR, the set of configurations that have ρ as parameters and n processes initially
is Cρ = {c ∈ C | param(c) = ρ, and
∑
s∈S0 κ(c)(s) = ρ(n)}. Let O
ρ
T = (Cρ,⊑, A) denote the
POTS restricted to these configurations.
There is a strong link between LTA and LDTS. More precisely, fix a valuation ρ ∈ NR.













is defined for every ℓ ∈ N, s ∈ Sℓ and s′ ∈ Sℓ+1 by:
guardρ(s, s′) =
{
x ∈ P → S⊥ | ρ,
[
s 7→
∣∣x−1({s})∣∣] |= guard(s, s′)} .
Let Csρ = Pρ → S+ denote the set of succinct configurations of Dρ. Consider cs ∈ Csρ and
define countCsρ (c












(s)(ℓ) = |{p ∈ Pρ | cs(p)(ℓ) = s}|









p ∈ Pρ |
cs(p)(ℓ) = s




ℓ∈N {[p : s→ s′] | p ∈ Pρ, s ∈ Sℓ, s′ ∈ Sℓ+1} denotes the set of succinct actions
of Dρ. Define a monoid morphism countAsρ : A
s
ρ
∗ → A∗ such that for [p : s→ s′] ∈ Asρ,
countAsρ(tr (p, s, s
′)) = [s→ s′]. So defined:
▶ Proposition 17. The mappings countCsρ : C
s
ρ → Cρ and countAsρ : A
s
ρ
∗ → A∗ define an




to the counter POTS (Cρ,⊑, A).
Proposition 17 holds for any parameter valuation ρ ∈ NR. Thus, a single LTA represents
infinitely-many LDTS, one for each parameter valuation.
Similarly to the case of LTA, one can define coherence of configurations for LDTS, and
obtain an equivalent of Theorem 15 at the counter abstraction level.
▶ Definition 18. Configuration c ∈ C is said counter coherent when for every ℓ ∈ N, s ∈ Sℓ
and s′ ∈ Sℓ+1, if flow(c)(s, s′) > 0, then c |= guard(s, s′).
▶ Theorem 19. Let c, c′ ∈ Cρ be two configurations such that c is counter coherent. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
c ⊑ c′ and c′ is counter coherent;
There exists a (possibly infinite) schedule σ ∈ A∗ applicable at c such that c ⋆ σ = c′.
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The flow conditions and the counter coherence can easily be encoded as a set of linear
arithmetic formulas that do not depend on the number of processes. In particular, if the
LTA is finite, then the resulting set of equations is finite as well, making the reachability
problem decidable in this case (for initial and target states represented by linear arithmetic
formulas). This can be used to verify not only safety properties, but also liveness properties
as configurations represent potentially infinite behaviors and contain information about the
whole execution. Theorem 19 differs from the threshold automata approach [20] because a
schedule does not need to be explicitely built. In particular, the layering assumption implies
that the order in which guards become true is irrelevant, which simplifies a lot the SMT
queries. More importantly, our approach applies to infinite automata where methods based
on bounding the diameter of the transition system have little chance of succeeding.
v0 v1 acc






+ 1− f x ≥ n− t− f
(b) Layered.
Figure 3 Two threshold automata for the reliable broadcast algorithm [11].
▶ Example 20. Theorem 19 heavily relies on the layered hypothesis. To see that, consider the
non layered model of Figure 3a. Let c be a configuration with flow(c)(v0, v1) > 0. Then the
counter coherence would require that c |= v1 ≥ t+1−f , however, this last condition may only
hold because the transition was taken in the first place, resulting in spurious configurations.
This can be fixed by tweaking the model in order to make it layered as seen on Figure 3b.
3.4 Guard Abstraction
Consider an LTA T = (R, S, guard). Even when S is finite, its configuration set C is infinite
as the number of processes n is unbounded. When S is infinite, then C is infinite in two
dimensions: it consists of infinitely many variables that may take infinitely many values. The
guard abstraction presented here aims at partitioning these values into finitely many classes.
The resulting model will however remain infinite, if S is.
Consider a set G ⊂ PA(S ∪ R) of monotonous guards, that is, every g ∈ G is a linear
arithmetic formulas with free variables in S ∪ R such that for ρ ∈ NR and κ, κ′ ∈ NS , if
κ ≤ κ′ pointwise and if ρ, κ |= g, then ρ, κ′ |= g as well.
Intuitively, the guard abstraction only records the valuations of the guards, not the
number of processes in each state. For this idea to succeed, the valuations of the guards
must converge during an execution, which is guaranteed by the following proposition.




defined by evalG(c) =
{g ∈ G | c |= g} is Scott-continuous.
4 Guard Automata towards Practical Implementation
While Theorem 19 suffices to verify finite LTA through the counter abstraction, it falls short
at capturing infinite models that arise for instance from round-based algorithms. This section
introduces guard automata as a finite-state abstraction which is sound, yet, unsurprisingly,
not complete in general and may introduce spurious counterexamples.
N. Bertrand, B. Thomas, and J. Widder 15:13
4.1 Cyclic LTA
Towards algorithmic considerations and practical implementations, the rest of the paper
focuses on round-based distributed algorithms, which can be captured by cyclic LTA. Intuit-
ively, a cyclic LTA is used to model an LTA that repeats a finite series of layers indefinitely.
For k ∈ N>0, a k-cyclic LTA (k-CLTA) is a tuple T c = (R, Sc, guardc) where:
R is a finite set of parameters.
Sc is a finite set of states partitioned into k layers Sc = Sc0 ∪ · · · ∪ Sck−1.
guardc : Sc2 → PA(R ∪ Sc) is a finite set of guards such that for ℓ < k, sc ∈ Scℓ and
sc′ ∈ Sc, guardc(sc, sc′) ∈ PA(R ∪ Scℓ ) and if sc
′ /∈ Scℓ+1 mod k, then guard
c(sc, sc′) = false.
Unfolding a k-CLTA yields an infinite-state acyclic LTA unfold (R, Sc, guardc). Formally
unfold (R, Sc, guardc) = (R, S, guard) with:
S = {(sc, ℓ) | ℓ ∈ N, sc ∈ Scℓ mod k}
For ℓ ∈ N, sc ∈ Scℓ mod k and sc
′ ∈ Scℓ+1 mod k, guard
(
(sc, ℓ), (sc′, ℓ + 1)
)
=
guardc(sc, sc′)[sc′′ ← (sc′′, ℓ) for sc′′ ∈ Scℓ mod k] meaning that any free variable sc
′′ ∈ Sc
that appears in guardc(sc, sc′) gets replaced with (sc′′, ℓ). In any other case, guard is false.
4.2 Guard Automaton
From the guard abstraction, one can construct a finite-state automaton that represents the
set of reachable configurations of a cyclic LTA.
Let T c = (R, Sc, guardc) be a k-CLTA equipped with a finite set of guards expressed in




ℓ such that for ℓ < k, Gcℓ ∈ PA(Scℓ ∪R). In practice, Gc
will include all guards appearing in the LTA, as well as the events that need to be observed.
A CLTA can be unfolded into an infinite-state LTA, by concatenating copies of T c.
In order for the guard abstraction to be formally defined, copies of the guards in Gc
for each new layer are required. For ℓ ∈ N a layer index and gc ∈ Gcℓ mod k a guard,
unfoldGℓ(gc) = gc[sc ← (sc, ℓ) for sc ∈ Scℓ mod k] denotes the guard obtained by replacing
every free occurrence of a variable sc ∈ Scℓ mod k in gc by (sc, ℓ). The converse folding operation
is defined by: foldGℓ(g) = g[(sc, ℓ)← sc, for sc ∈ Scℓ mod k]. Finally, Gℓ = unfold
G (Gcℓ mod k)
is the set of guards at layer ℓ and G =
⋃
ℓ∈NGℓ the set of all guards.
The guard abstraction maps every configuration of unfold(T c) to a set of guards that
hold in that configuration. Formally, evalG : C → 2G. A set of guards γ ∈ 2G can be
represented with the sequence γ0γ1 . . . , where for ℓ ∈ N, γℓ = γ ∩Gℓ. foldG(γ) then denotes
the sequence foldG0(γ0) · foldG1(γ1) · · · · ∈
(
2Gc
)ω and unfoldG is the converse operation
that applies unfoldGℓ to the elements of layer ℓ in the sequence. Doing so, a configuration





































ℓ mod k →
∏
ℓ∈N 2Gℓ
Figure 4 From a configuration to a word over the finite alphabet of the guard automaton.
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For ℓ < k a layer index, γc ∈ 2Gcℓ and γc′ ∈ 2G
c
ℓ+1 mod k guard valuations of layer ℓ and
the next layer, one can use an SMT solver to check whether γc′ is a successor γc. Precisely,
the SMT query asks for the existence of x ∈ NScℓ , y ∈ NS
c




ℓ+1 mod N such
















































> 0 −→ guardc(sc, sc′) (3)
The guard automaton is a finite automaton whose language overapproximates the set
of reachable configurations. It bears similarities with de Bruijn graphs [15] used e.g. in




ℓ+1 mod k denotes the set of all pairs γc, γc′ that verify
conditions (1) and and (3), one can build the set E =
⋃
ℓ<k Eℓ.
▶ Definition 22. The guard automaton of T c is GAG(T c) =
(
Σ, E, 2Gc0 , src, dest, label
)
where:
Σ is both the alphabet and the set of states.
2Gc0 ⊂ Σ is the set of initial states.
E ⊂ Σ2 defined above is the set of edges, equipped with src : E → Σ (resp. dest : E → Σ)
that defines the source state (resp. destination state) of every edge, and label : E → Σ
associates a label to each edge defined by label(γc, γc′) = γc.





label(e1) · · · · , and L(GAG(T c)) ⊂ Σω denotes the language of GAG(T c).
▶ Example 23. Algorithm 1 can be described by the following CLTA with k = 1. The
parameters are R = {n, t, f} where f denotes the actual number of Byzantine faults. States
are Sc = {v0, k0, v1, k1}. The guards here only depend on the next value of v. For instance:
guard(_, v0) = (v0 + k0 + v1 + k1 + f = n)
∧
((




(2v0 +2k0 ≤ n+2t)∧(2v1 +2k1 ≤ n+2t)∧(k1 = 0)
))
.
Also, guard(_, k0) = guard(_, v0) and guard(_, v1) = guard(_, k1) is defined symmetrically.
A configuration c of the unfolded LTA is depicted bottom-right of Figure 2, where the array
contains the valuation κ(c) and the arrows represent the flow. For example κ(c)(v1, 0) = 2,
flow(c)((v0, 0), (k1, 1)) = 1 and flow(c)((v0, 0), (v0, 1)) = 0.
The guard abstraction transforms c into the guard configuration bottom-left of Figure 2.
Here, we chose the set of guards Gc to consist of s > 0 for each s ∈ Sc and of the guards
of the LTA. The alphabet Σ contains e.g., (T · T · · · · · T ). SMT queries determine whether
two letters may appear successively, in order to build the guard automaton. For instance,
according to the first two layers of evalG(c), (T · T · · · · · T ) can be followed by (T · TT · · · ·T ).
There will therefore be a transition between these two states in the guard automaton.
▶ Theorem 24. Let c ∈ C be a configuration of unfold(T c) and evalG(c) ∈ 2G its guard
abstraction. If c is counter-coherent, then foldG (evalG(c)) ∈ L(GAG(T c)).
By soundness of the guard automaton construction, a property which holds on configur-
ations that correspond to runs of GAG(T c) also holds on the configurations of unfold(T c).
A simple verification procedure thus consists in checking that L(GAG(T c)) is included in a
given language of correct configurations. At a first glance, it might seem that only safety
properties can be checked. However, the guard automaton also represents configurations
reachable by infinite schedules, making the verification of liveness properties feasible.











P = {n, t, f} and for x, y ∈ {0, 1}:
guard(vx, px) = true
guard(vx, kx,y) = [2(vy + f) ≥ n]
guard(_, vx) = [2(px + kx,0 + kx,1) > n + 2t]∨2(p0 + k0,0 + k0,1) ≤ n + 2t∧2(p1 + k1,0 + k1,1) ≤ n + 2t∧
k0,x + k1,x = 0

Figure 5 A 2-CLTA for the Phase King algorithm with non-deterministic choice of the king. A
process in kx,y is king of the current round, its current value is x and it thinks the majority is y.
▶ Example 25. For presentation purposes, Algorithm 1 is an overly simplified version of
the Phase King algorithm [8]. The latter can be faithfully encoded by the 2-CLTA T c of
Figure 5, where the updated value when there is no clear majority is not the king’s value,
but rather the majority of the values received by the king. Each round consists of two
layers of communication, a first in which each process broadcasts its value, and a second
in which the king broadcasts what it thinks is the majority. The set of guards at the
first layer is Gc0 = {v0 > 0, v1 > 0} and at the second layer Gc1 consists of k0,0+k1,0 > 0,
k0,1+k1,1 > 0, p0+k0,0+k0,1 > 0, p1+k1,0+k1,1 > 0, 2(k0,0+k0,1+p0+f) > n+2t and
2(k1,0+k1,1+p1+f) > n+2t.
Restricting to valuations with
∑
s∈Sℓ s+f = n (fairness) and k0,0+k0,1+k1,0+k1,1 ≤ 1
(at most one king), the resulting guard automaton has 3 states in even layers and 11 in odd
layers. Writing [formula] for the set of letters in 2Gc for which formula holds, one can show:
L(GAG(T c)) ⊂ [¬(k0,0 + k1,0 > 0) ∧ ¬(k0,1 + k1,1 > 0)]ω (4)
∪ Σ∗[(k0,0 + k1,0 > 0) ∨ (k0,1 + k1,1 > 0)][¬(p0 + k0,0 + k0,1 > 0)]ω (5)
∪ Σ∗[(k0,0 + k1,0 > 0) ∨ (k0,1 + k1,1 > 0)][¬(p1 + k1,0 + k1,1 > 0)]ω . (6)
Therefore, either every chosen king is Byzantine (4), or all processes agree on a value after a
non-Byzantine king is chosen (5 or 6).
In general, although is it sound, the guard automaton construction is not complete: the
language may contain words that correspond to no configuration of the LTA. As usual for
incomplete methods, heuristics can be used to remove some spurious counterexamples.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a methodology, based on domain theory, to represent and analyze
distributed algorithms. Infinite-state models are abstracted into finite-state guard automata,
on which one can check safety and liveness properties.
Optimizing and benchmarking the guard automaton implementation is on our current
agenda to demonstrate the applicability of our methodology to standard distributed al-
gorithms. A more long-term research objective is to build on the current contribution to
develop a rigorous framework for the verification of randomized distributed algorithms.
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